T T
he original "demographic transition" describes a process that began in he original "demographic transition" describes a process that began in Europe by the early 1800s with decreases in mortality followed, usually after Europe by the early 1800s with decreases in mortality followed, usually after a lag, by decreases in fertility (Davis 1945 ; for an overview in this journal, a lag, by decreases in fertility (Davis 1945 ; for an overview in this journal, see Lee 2003) . According to Lee and Reher see Lee 2003) . According to Lee and Reher (2011, p. 1) , "this historical process (2011, p. 1) , "this historical process ranks as one of the most important changes affecting human society in the past ranks as one of the most important changes affecting human society in the past half millennium." The increase in life expectancy associated with this demographic half millennium." The increase in life expectancy associated with this demographic transition has been accompanied by rising levels of per capita output, which have transition has been accompanied by rising levels of per capita output, which have in turn spurred further improvements in population health through better nutriin turn spurred further improvements in population health through better nutrition and living standards (Fogel 1994; Barker 1990 ) and, especially since World tion and living standards (Fogel 1994; Barker 1990 ) and, especially since World War II, through advances in medical care (in this journal, Cutler, Deaton, and War II, through advances in medical care (in this journal, Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006) . At the same time, increases in life expectancy have resulted in Lleras-Muney 2006) . At the same time, increases in life expectancy have resulted in a higher proportion of each cohort living long enough to participate in the produca higher proportion of each cohort living long enough to participate in the production of goods and services. Reductions in fertility are also closely linked to higher tion of goods and services. Reductions in fertility are also closely linked to higher labor force participation rates among women (Galor and Weil 1996; Costa 2000 ; labor force participation rates among women (Galor and Weil 1996; Costa 2000; Guinnane 2011 ). Guinnane 2011) .
During the original demographic transition, mortality decline prior to fertility During the original demographic transition, mortality decline prior to fertility decline often led to larger cohorts concentrated in working ages; this transitional decline often led to larger cohorts concentrated in working ages; this transitional change in the age structure of the population provided a boost to income that has change in the age structure of the population provided a boost to income that has been called a "demographic dividend" (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003) . Swift been called a "demographic dividend" (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003) . Swift (2011) documents a signifi cant two-way positive relationship between life expec-(2011) documents a signifi cant two-way positive relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita between 1820 and 2001 for 13 high-income countries. tancy and GDP per capita between 1820 and 2001 for 13 high-income countries. Now, the United States and many other countries are experiencing a new kind Now, the United States and many other countries are experiencing a new kind of demographic transition. Instead of additional years of life being realized early of demographic transition. Instead of additional years of life being realized early in the lifecycle, they are now being realized late in life. At the beginning of the in the lifecycle, they are now being realized late in life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the United States and other countries at comparable stages of twentieth century, in the United States and other countries at comparable stages of development, most of the additional years of life were realized in youth and working development, most of the additional years of life were realized in youth and working ages; and less than 20 percent was realized after age 65. Now, more than 75 percent ages; and less than 20 percent was realized after age 65. Now, more than 75 percent of the gains in life expectancy are realized after 65-and that share is approaching of the gains in life expectancy are realized after 65-and that share is approaching 100 percent asymptotically. The choice of age 65 to illustrate this new demographic 100 percent asymptotically. The choice of age 65 to illustrate this new demographic transition is somewhat arbitrary, but if we used 60 or 70 instead, the results would transition is somewhat arbitrary, but if we used 60 or 70 instead, the results would be qualitatively similar. be qualitatively similar.
The new demographic transition is a The new demographic transition is a longevity transition: How will individuals transition: How will individuals and societies respond to mortality decline when almost all of the decline will occur and societies respond to mortality decline when almost all of the decline will occur late in life? This issue is broader and more far-reaching than the issue of cohort size late in life? This issue is broader and more far-reaching than the issue of cohort size in each age group, with its usual focus on the prospective retirement of the unusuin each age group, with its usual focus on the prospective retirement of the unusually large "baby boomer" cohort, and has important socioeconomic implications ally large "baby boomer" cohort, and has important socioeconomic implications independent of patterns of fertility. independent of patterns of fertility.
When the gains in life expectancy occur mainly towards the end of life, they When the gains in life expectancy occur mainly towards the end of life, they contribute more to the age bracket that is traditionally mostly retired rather than to contribute more to the age bracket that is traditionally mostly retired rather than to the age bracket in prime working years. Retirees are highly dependent on transfers the age bracket in prime working years. Retirees are highly dependent on transfers from the working population for living expenses, including large consumption of from the working population for living expenses, including large consumption of medical care. Thus, gains in life expectancy concentrated at the end of life can medical care. Thus, gains in life expectancy concentrated at the end of life can unsettle an economy's balance between production and consumption in ways that unsettle an economy's balance between production and consumption in ways that pose a long-run challenge for public policy. The obvious changes needed (at least pose a long-run challenge for public policy. The obvious changes needed (at least "obvious" to many economists) would be to raise productivity, the savings rate, "obvious" to many economists) would be to raise productivity, the savings rate, and the age of retirement, but how to accomplish such goals is controversial and and the age of retirement, but how to accomplish such goals is controversial and uncertain. uncertain. This paper covers the years 1900-2007 for the United States and 16 other This paper covers the years 1900-2007 for the United States and 16 other "developed countries," chosen for the continuity of their mortality data: Australia, "developed countries," chosen for the continuity of their mortality data: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. We focus on demographic statistics including life expectancy at birth and at age 65, We focus on demographic statistics including life expectancy at birth and at age 65, the percent of each birth cohort expected to survive to age 65, and the share of the the percent of each birth cohort expected to survive to age 65, and the share of the increase in life expectancy at birth realized after age 65. For the U.S. economy, we increase in life expectancy at birth realized after age 65. For the U.S. economy, we also calculate expected labor force participation for each birth cohort, which allows also calculate expected labor force participation for each birth cohort, which allows us to investigate how changes in mortality affect labor force participation and workus to investigate how changes in mortality affect labor force participation and worklife as a share of life expectancy. Results on the longevity transition and expected life as a share of life expectancy. Results on the longevity transition and expected labor force participation for the United States and other high-income countries labor force participation for the United States and other high-income countries are followed by consideration of economic and social changes in China and other are followed by consideration of economic and social changes in China and other countries that are experiencing an earlier stage of the original demographic transicountries that are experiencing an earlier stage of the original demographic transition. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the long-run implications of the tion. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the long-run implications of the new demographic transition. new demographic transition.
The Longevity Transition
To examine long-term trends in life expectancy at birth, we draw upon the life To examine long-term trends in life expectancy at birth, we draw upon the life tables in the Human Mortality Database, which offers high-quality demographic tables in the Human Mortality Database, which offers high-quality demographic data for selected countries and regions compiled by a respected group of demogradata for selected countries and regions compiled by a respected group of demographers at phers at ⟨ ⟨http://www.mortality.org http://www.mortality.org⟩ ⟩. We fi rst extract data on life expectancy at birth;
. We fi rst extract data on life expectancy at birth; in particular, we calculate "period" life expectancy, which is the projected average in particular, we calculate "period" life expectancy, which is the projected average age of death for a cohort if it experienced the age-specifi c death rates prevailing age of death for a cohort if it experienced the age-specifi c death rates prevailing at the year of birth. We also look at rates of survival from birth to age 65 and life at the year of birth. We also look at rates of survival from birth to age 65 and life expectancy at age 65. We use the fi ve-year period life tables since 1900 (or earliest expectancy at age 65. We use the fi ve-year period life tables since 1900 (or earliest available year) for each of the 17 countries or regions in the Human Mortality Dataavailable year) for each of the 17 countries or regions in the Human Mortality Database that have data extending back at least 70 years. The fi ve-year intervals help to base that have data extending back at least 70 years. The fi ve-year intervals help to smooth annual fl uctuations in demographic trends. smooth annual fl uctuations in demographic trends.
We calculate changes for nine overlapping 20-year intervals: 1907-1927, 1917- We calculate changes for nine overlapping 20-year intervals: 1907-1927, 1917-1937, and so on up to 1987-2007. 1937, and so on up to 1987-2007. 1 1 (The years ending in "7" are chosen to represent (The years ending in "7" are chosen to represent mid points of each of our fi ve-year intervals.) To calculate the change in years lived mid points of each of our fi ve-year intervals.) To calculate the change in years lived past 65, we fi rst multiply survival to 65 by life expectancy at age 65 for each fi ve-year past 65, we fi rst multiply survival to 65 by life expectancy at age 65 for each fi ve-year period and then take differences across 20-year intervals. Finally, we calculate the period and then take differences across 20-year intervals. Finally, we calculate the change in years lived past 65 as a percentage of change in life expectancy at birth change in years lived past 65 as a percentage of change in life expectancy at birth for each country for each of the nine 20-year intervals. for each country for each of the nine 20-year intervals. Figure 1A shows that life expectancy at birth has increased almost continuously Figure 1A shows that life expectancy at birth has increased almost continuously for well over a century in high-income countries. Much of this rise in life expectancy for well over a century in high-income countries. Much of this rise in life expectancy was due to a particularly large fall in death rates for infants, children, and young was due to a particularly large fall in death rates for infants, children, and young adults, resulting in a sharp rise in the percentage of a cohort surviving to age 65, as adults, resulting in a sharp rise in the percentage of a cohort surviving to age 65, as indicated in Figure 1B . Survival rates from birth to age 65 more than doubled over indicated in Figure 1B . Survival rates from birth to age 65 more than doubled over the twentieth century from 40.9 percent in 1900-04 to 83.3 percent in 2005-09 in the twentieth century from 40.9 percent in 1900-04 to 83.3 percent in 2005-09 in the United States. Similarly, survival rates from birth to age 65 in 16 high-income the United States. Similarly, survival rates from birth to age 65 in 16 high-income comparators increased from 42.0 to 87.8 percent over the same period. comparators increased from 42.0 to 87.8 percent over the same period.
The other major demographic change that contributes to the longevity transiThe other major demographic change that contributes to the longevity transition is an increase in life expectancy at age 65, an increase which has become larger tion is an increase in life expectancy at age 65, an increase which has become larger in recent decades as shown in Figure 2A . The interaction between the increase in life in recent decades as shown in Figure 2A . The interaction between the increase in life expectancy at age 65 and the increase in the percentage of the cohort that survives to expectancy at age 65 and the increase in the percentage of the cohort that survives to age 65 has resulted in an exceptionally large increase in the share of the gain in life age 65 has resulted in an exceptionally large increase in the share of the gain in life expectancy that is realized after age 65. As can be seen in Figure 2B , that share was expectancy that is realized after age 65. As can be seen in Figure 2B , that share was only about 20 percent during each 20-year period at the beginning of the twentieth only about 20 percent during each 20-year period at the beginning of the twentieth century, but it was 76 percent in the United States and 78 percent for the 16-country century, but it was 76 percent in the United States and 78 percent for the 16-country mean by the end of the century, and is approaching 100 percent asymptotically. Our mean by the end of the century, and is approaching 100 percent asymptotically. Our results here are quite similar to, and extend over time, those of Lee and Tuljapurkar results here are quite similar to, and extend over time, those of Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997) We can illustrate the shift in survival improvement toward older ages by We can illustrate the shift in survival improvement toward older ages by comparing the age distribution of mortality decline between the fi rst half and comparing the age distribution of mortality decline between the fi rst half and second half of the twentieth century for a region with particularly reliable long-run second half of the twentieth century for a region with particularly reliable long-run data: England and Wales. Figure 3 shows that between 1900 -1904 and 1950 -1954 , data: England and Wales. Figure 3 shows that between 1900 -1904 and 1950 -1954 , declines in death rates were largest for infants and children, whereas between declines in death rates were largest for infants and children, whereas between 1950-54 and 2000-2004, declines were most salient for those over age 70. This 1950 70. This -54 and 2000 70. This -2004 , declines were most salient for those over age 70. This pattern of age-specifi c mortality decline across the twentieth century was similar for pattern of age-specifi c mortality decline across the twentieth century was similar for Sweden, another country where reliable long-run data is available. Sweden, another country where reliable long-run data is available. The actual survival of a given birth cohort will differ from the estimates of life The actual survival of a given birth cohort will differ from the estimates of life expectancy at birth when survival is changing over time. Remember, estimates of expectancy at birth when survival is changing over time. Remember, estimates of life expectancy at birth (what we earlier called "period" life expectancy) are based life expectancy at birth (what we earlier called "period" life expectancy) are based on the age-specifi c death rates prevailing at that year of birth. For example, in on the age-specifi c death rates prevailing at that year of birth. For example, in 1900-04, life expectancy at birth in England and Wales was 48.6 years. In contrast, 1900-04, life expectancy at birth in England and Wales was 48.6 years. In contrast, the cohort born in 1900-1904 had a cohort life expectancy (actual mean age of the cohort born in 1900-1904 had a cohort life expectancy (actual mean age of death) of 53.8 years, since they experienced part of the increase in survival shown death) of 53.8 years, since they experienced part of the increase in survival shown The cohort born only 17 years later experienced a cohort life expectancy of 62.4 years, whereas "period" life expectancy at birth did not reach that level tancy of 62.4 years, whereas "period" life expectancy at birth did not reach that level until 1935-1939. until 1935-1939. 3 3
Nevertheless, we fi nd that estimates based on cohort life tables prepared by Nevertheless, we fi nd that estimates based on cohort life tables prepared by the Social Security Administration (Bell and Miller 2005) Figure 1B) ; also, the United States experienced is below the 16-country average in Figure 1B) ; also, the United States experienced a larger rise in female life expectancy at age 65 between the 1940s and 1970s than a larger rise in female life expectancy at age 65 between the 1940s and 1970s than the other countries. The relative differences among countries have decreased over the other countries. The relative differences among countries have decreased over time, especially for life expectancy at birth and survival to age 65. time, especially for life expectancy at birth and survival to age 65.
The Longevity Transition and Expected Labor Force Participation
One of the most signifi cant economic effects of the longevity transition is on One of the most signifi cant economic effects of the longevity transition is on expected lifetime labor force participation, partly in terms of total years in the workexpected lifetime labor force participation, partly in terms of total years in the workforce and especially in terms of years in the workforce as a fraction of expected years force and especially in terms of years in the workforce as a fraction of expected years of life. Two factors affecting the connection from life expectancy to years of work of life. Two factors affecting the connection from life expectancy to years of work are 1) whether the growing numbers of elderly are healthy enough to work and are 1) whether the growing numbers of elderly are healthy enough to work and 2) the economic, social, and political pressures for a period of retirement at the 2) the economic, social, and political pressures for a period of retirement at the end of life. end of life.
Greater longevity can have opposing effects on age-specifi c health status. If Greater longevity can have opposing effects on age-specifi c health status. If improved survival is correlated with reductions in morbidity for the elderly, then improved survival is correlated with reductions in morbidity for the elderly, then illness may be compressed into the end of life, as posited by the "compression of illness may be compressed into the end of life, as posited by the "compression of morbidity" hypothesis (Fries 1980) . On the other side, medical interventions do morbidity" hypothesis (Fries 1980) . On the other side, medical interventions do tend to keep alive those who are in worse health (Zeckhauser, Sato, and Rizzo tend to keep alive those who are in worse health (Zeckhauser, Sato, and Rizzo 1985) , which suggests the possibility that the longer-lived elderly could be sicker 1985), which suggests the possibility that the longer-lived elderly could be sicker for a longer period. The net effect of rising longevity on age-specifi c morbidity is for a longer period. The net effect of rising longevity on age-specifi c morbidity is an empirical question. According to the National Long-Term Care Survey, the share an empirical question. According to the National Long-Term Care Survey, the share of elderly Americans with severe disabilities decreased from 26.2 to 19.7 percent of elderly Americans with severe disabilities decreased from 26.2 to 19.7 percent between 1982 and 1999 (Manton and Gu 2001) . Milligan and Wise (2011) fi nd a between 1982 and 1999 (Manton and Gu 2001) . Milligan and Wise (2011) fi nd a strong within-country correlation between declining mortality and improved selfstrong within-country correlation between declining mortality and improved selfassessed health for several European countries. Thus, the empirical record suggests assessed health for several European countries. Thus, the empirical record suggests that better health in terms of both improved survival and reduced morbidity could that better health in terms of both improved survival and reduced morbidity could tend to raise age-specifi c rates of labor force participation. Changes in occupational tend to raise age-specifi c rates of labor force participation. Changes in occupational structure which lower the physical demands of work also can increase participation. structure which lower the physical demands of work also can increase participation.
Higher incomes tend to increase the demand for leisure, in the form of fewer Higher incomes tend to increase the demand for leisure, in the form of fewer hours of work per week and, especially recently, as a block at the end of life (Costa hours of work per week and, especially recently, as a block at the end of life (Costa 1998; Murphy and Topel 2006) . Furthermore, several factors might give rise to 1998; Murphy and Topel 2006) . Furthermore, several factors might give rise to a negative interaction between improved survival and employment, at least for a negative interaction between improved survival and employment, at least for some subgroups. For example, the reduced selection effect of mortality might also some subgroups. For example, the reduced selection effect of mortality might also increase the proportion of the cohort that is less valued in employment (because of increase the proportion of the cohort that is less valued in employment (because of less stamina, ambition, education, and the like), reducing age-specifi c labor force less stamina, ambition, education, and the like), reducing age-specifi c labor force participation. Alternatively, if fi rms have pyramid-like organizational structures with participation. Alternatively, if fi rms have pyramid-like organizational structures with many jobs at entry and fewer at higher levels in the hierarchy-such as the milimany jobs at entry and fewer at higher levels in the hierarchy-such as the military's "up or out" policy regarding age and promotion of offi cers-then increases tary's "up or out" policy regarding age and promotion of offi cers-then increases in survival will lead to crowding at higher levels of the pyramid and lower rates in survival will lead to crowding at higher levels of the pyramid and lower rates of participation. Moreover, a sharp rise in employment rates for women, at wages of participation. Moreover, a sharp rise in employment rates for women, at wages that were often below those paid to men, might have led to some decrease in the that were often below those paid to men, might have led to some decrease in the demand for men's labor. demand for men's labor.
On net, which of these forces have predominated over the past century, and On net, which of these forces have predominated over the past century, and which are likely to predominate in the future? Estimates of what we call "expected which are likely to predominate in the future? Estimates of what we call "expected labor force participation" can help answer this question. labor force participation" can help answer this question.
Calculating Expected Labor Force Participation
We defi ne "expected labor force participation" (XLFP) as the total years an We defi ne "expected labor force participation" (XLFP) as the total years an individual is expected to participate in the labor force, based on period estimates of individual is expected to participate in the labor force, based on period estimates of survival, and labor force participation by gender and age. That is survival, and labor force participation by gender and age. That is
where L ijt is the labor force participation rate for age i and gender j in year t, weighted by probability of survival to age i (π ijt ). It is necessary to examine men and women separately because of the large upsurge in female labor force participation between the 1950s and 2000 (Goldin 1986 (Goldin , 1990 Costa 2000) . Our calculations rely on labor force participation rates from decennial censuses and the Current Population Survey . As in the earlier estimates of life expectancy, we can calculate both "period" expected labor force participation, which is based on the age-specifi c labor force participation rates prevailing at a certain point of time, or the actual realized labor force participation rates for a birth cohort; these estimates will differ when age-specifi c labor force participation rates are changing over time.
Changes in lifetime expected labor force participation can be decomposed Changes in lifetime expected labor force participation can be decomposed into two factors: changes in survival to given ages and changes in age/sex-specifi c into two factors: changes in survival to given ages and changes in age/sex-specifi c rates of labor force participation. For example, we calculate the effect of improving rates of labor force participation. For example, we calculate the effect of improving survival, holding age-specifi c labor force participation rates constant at their 2007 survival, holding age-specifi c labor force participation rates constant at their 2007 values. We also calculate the effect of changing rates of labor force participation, values. We also calculate the effect of changing rates of labor force participation, holding survival rates constant. holding survival rates constant. 4 4 Our work is related to the literature on expected lifetime work hours (Hazan Our work is related to the literature on expected lifetime work hours (Hazan 2009) and work-life expectancy (Smith 1982) , including the work-life estimates for 2009) and work-life expectancy (Smith 1982) , including the work-life estimates for the U.S. population from the 1950s through the early 1980s from the Bureau of the U.S. population from the 1950s through the early 1980s from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Statistics.
5 5 As far as we are aware, this paper is the fi rst to produce work-life As far as we are aware, this paper is the fi rst to produce work-life estimates for the United States covering the period 1900 to 2007, decompose those estimates for the United States covering the period 1900 to 2007, decompose those changes into survival and age/sex-specifi c labor force participation effects, and to changes into survival and age/sex-specifi c labor force participation effects, and to estimate work-life expectancy relative to life expectancy at birth for a broader range estimate work-life expectancy relative to life expectancy at birth for a broader range of countries in recent decades. of countries in recent decades.
U.S. Expected Labor Force Participation since 1900
In the early twentieth century, most of the increase in life expectancy arose In the early twentieth century, most of the increase in life expectancy arose from the dramatic decrease in mortality at young ages. This change fi rst increased from the dramatic decrease in mortality at young ages. This change fi rst increased the years of youth dependency for these cohorts, and then increased expected labor the years of youth dependency for these cohorts, and then increased expected labor force participation-the expected number of years that an individual will be in the force participation-the expected number of years that an individual will be in the labor force if he or she participates at the average labor force participation rate for labor force if he or she participates at the average labor force participation rate for each sex and age in a given year. each sex and age in a given year. Figure 4A shows that years of expected labor force participation at birth for U.S. Figure 4A shows that years of expected labor force participation at birth for U.S. males increased by a third-from about 30 to 40 years-between 1900 and 1950. males increased by a third-from about 30 to 40 years-between 1900 and 1950. For the most recent half century, however, increases in survival have been offset by For the most recent half century, however, increases in survival have been offset by decreasing age-specifi c labor force participation rates for men, causing expected decreasing age-specifi c labor force participation rates for men, causing expected lifetime labor force participation to be relatively constant at about 40 years. Because lifetime labor force participation to be relatively constant at about 40 years. Because life expectancy at birth has continued to increase, male expected labor force particilife expectancy at birth has continued to increase, male expected labor force participation as a fraction of expected years of life has declined, as shown in Figure 4B . pation as a fraction of expected years of life has declined, as shown in Figure 4B . Table 1 shows that in the United States between 1900 and 2000, male labor force Table 1 shows that in the United States between 1900 and 2000, male labor force participation increased from 30 to 40.5 years, female participation from 6.4 years participation increased from 30 to 40.5 years, female participation from 6.4 years to 34.4 years, and for the total population from 18.5 to 37.4 years. This increase in to 34.4 years, and for the total population from 18.5 to 37.4 years. This increase in years of expected labor participation is two-thirds of the total gain in life expectancy years of expected labor participation is two-thirds of the total gain in life expectancy at birth of 28.2 years over the twentieth century. at birth of 28.2 years over the twentieth century.
How much of this change is attributable just to longer life expectancies? If How much of this change is attributable just to longer life expectancies? If we hold age-specifi c rates of labor force participation constant but allow survival we hold age-specifi c rates of labor force participation constant but allow survival rates to grow at the actually observed pace, the rise in life expectancy alone would rates to grow at the actually observed pace, the rise in life expectancy alone would have increased expected labor force participation by 13.3 years for males and by have increased expected labor force participation by 13.3 years for males and by 10.8 years for females since 1900 (as shown in Table 1 ). The effect of mortality 10.8 years for females since 1900 (as shown in Table 1 ). The effect of mortality decline was concentrated in the fi rst half of the twentieth century. Indeed, for men, decline was concentrated in the fi rst half of the twentieth century. Indeed, for men, 1901 1910 1920 1933 1942 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 if we hold age-specifi c labor force participation rates constant but allow survival if we hold age-specifi c labor force participation rates constant but allow survival rates to vary in calculating expected labor force participation ("male XLFP holding rates to vary in calculating expected labor force participation ("male XLFP holding LFP constant"), the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life LFP constant"), the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth was relatively constant at 54 percent from early in the twentieth expectancy at birth was relatively constant at 54 percent from early in the twentieth century until about 1970 (not shown in the table). At that point, it began a slow but century until about 1970 (not shown in the table). At that point, it began a slow but seemingly inexorable decline, now falling to about 50 percent. seemingly inexorable decline, now falling to about 50 percent. Actual years of expected labor force participation, refl ecting both survival Actual years of expected labor force participation, refl ecting both survival effects and changes in age-specifi c labor force participation rates, have also begun effects and changes in age-specifi c labor force participation rates, have also begun to decline. As shown in both Table 1 and Figure 4B , the ratio of years of expected to decline. As shown in both Table 1 and Figure 4B , the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth (XLFP/LE labor force participation to life expectancy at birth (XLFP/LE 0 0 ) has declined ) has declined for U.S. men from 62.6 percent in 1900 to 51. Since 1950, increases in survival and declines in age-specifi c participation Since 1950, increases in survival and declines in age-specifi c participation rates of men tended to offset one another. For example, between 1950 and 2007, rates of men tended to offset one another. For example, between 1950 and 2007, labor force participation rates of men ages 45-54 declined from 95.8 percent to labor force participation rates of men ages 45-54 declined from 95.8 percent to 88.2 percent, but survival to age 50 increased from 84.1 to 92.2 percent, so the total 88.2 percent, but survival to age 50 increased from 84.1 to 92.2 percent, so the total expected years in the labor force between ages 45 and 55 remained eight years. expected years in the labor force between ages 45 and 55 remained eight years. For women, increases in years of expected labor force participation mostly For women, increases in years of expected labor force participation mostly refl ect increases in age-specifi c rates of labor force participation, especially after refl ect increases in age-specifi c rates of labor force participation, especially after 1950. Accordingly, for women, if we hold age-specifi c labor force participation 1950. Accordingly, for women, if we hold age-specifi c labor force participation rates constant but allow survival rates to vary in calculating expected labor force rates constant but allow survival rates to vary in calculating expected labor force participation ("female XLFP holding LFP constant"), the ratio of years of expected participation ("female XLFP holding LFP constant"), the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth has declined slowly but steadily labor force participation to life expectancy at birth has declined slowly but steadily from about 45 percent in the fi rst few decades of the twentieth century to about from about 45 percent in the fi rst few decades of the twentieth century to about 40 percent (not shown in the table). 40 percent (not shown in the table).
The increase in female labor force participation since the late 1950s could The increase in female labor force participation since the late 1950s could be considered primarily a one-time substitution from unpaid home production to be considered primarily a one-time substitution from unpaid home production to paid work outside the home (Goldin 1990; Costa 2000) . If so, then the decrease in paid work outside the home (Goldin 1990; Costa 2000) . If so, then the decrease in years of expected labor force participation for women in the United States since years of expected labor force participation for women in the United States since 2000 would refl ect completion of the one-off change and the beginning of a similar 2000 would refl ect completion of the one-off change and the beginning of a similar trend as seen for men-that is, a decline of years in the labor force as a share of life trend as seen for men-that is, a decline of years in the labor force as a share of life expectancy at birth. expectancy at birth.
Taking into account the decrease in the intensive margin-annual hours Taking into account the decrease in the intensive margin-annual hours worked per full-time worker-tends to reinforce the conclusion that expected worked per full-time worker-tends to reinforce the conclusion that expected work life has declined as a fraction of life expectancy at birth. Hazan (2009) work life has declined as a fraction of life expectancy at birth. Hazan (2009) estimated lifetime work hours over the past century conditional on survival to estimated lifetime work hours over the past century conditional on survival to age fi ve. We adapt Hazan's data to life expectancy at birth to calculate years of age fi ve. We adapt Hazan's data to life expectancy at birth to calculate years of expected labor force participation adjusted for hours worked and show the results expected labor force participation adjusted for hours worked and show the results in Table 1 (the online Appendix available with this paper at in Table 1 (the online Appendix available with this paper at ⟨ ⟨http://e-jep.org http://e-jep.org⟩ ⟩ has has details of our calculations). details of our calculations).
Calculation of a century-long trend in expected years of labor force participaCalculation of a century-long trend in expected years of labor force participation in other high-income countries is not possible because there is no reliable tion in other high-income countries is not possible because there is no reliable source for internationally comparable labor force participation rates before 1980. source for internationally comparable labor force participation rates before 1980. Given the similarities in trends of both survival and labor force participation across Given the similarities in trends of both survival and labor force participation across these countries for the available years, we suspect the trend of declining expected these countries for the available years, we suspect the trend of declining expected labor force participation as a share of life expectancy at birth that we found for the labor force participation as a share of life expectancy at birth that we found for the United States refl ects a broad and robust trend that countries experience as they United States refl ects a broad and robust trend that countries experience as they reach high life expectancy levels. Indeed, with the sole exception of the Netherlands, reach high life expectancy levels. Indeed, with the sole exception of the Netherlands, the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth has the ratio of years of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth has declined since 1980 for males in all other high-income countries in our analyses. declined since 1980 for males in all other high-income countries in our analyses. Adjusting for a decline in work hours would reinforce this trend. Adjusting for a decline in work hours would reinforce this trend.
Demographic Transition across Stages of Economic Development
The demographic transition traces out a pathway, with many societies arrayed The demographic transition traces out a pathway, with many societies arrayed along earlier phases of the transition roughly and imperfectly in accordance with along earlier phases of the transition roughly and imperfectly in accordance with their per capita incomes. Many developing countries are currently experiencing the their per capita incomes. Many developing countries are currently experiencing the original demographic transition. For example, Table 2 shows that between 1990 and original demographic transition. For example, Table 2 shows that between 1990 and 2010, the share of years lived past 65 as a percentage of increase in life expectancy at 2010, the share of years lived past 65 as a percentage of increase in life expectancy at birth was only a little over one-third in Vietnam and Brazil, and less than one-quarter in birth was only a little over one-third in Vietnam and Brazil, and less than one-quarter in Bangladesh-comparable to levels a century earlier in today's high-income countries. Bangladesh-comparable to levels a century earlier in today's high-income countries.
Improving health and increasing life expectancy at birth clearly can contribute Improving health and increasing life expectancy at birth clearly can contribute to better living standards for the world's poor (World Health Organization 2002) . to better living standards for the world's poor (World Health Organization 2002) . Data on labor force participation for developing countries is not always reliData on labor force participation for developing countries is not always reliably comparable across countries and over time. Nevertheless, the importance of ably comparable across countries and over time. Nevertheless, the importance of improved survival for gains in expected labor force participation at early stages improved survival for gains in expected labor force participation at early stages of the longevity transition can be illustrated with extant data. For example, in 1980 of the longevity transition can be illustrated with extant data. For example, in 1980 only 70 percent of Indonesian men survived to age 45; by 2007, 90 percent did. only 70 percent of Indonesian men survived to age 45; by 2007, 90 percent did. This improved survival added 10 years to expected labor force participation rates for This improved survival added 10 years to expected labor force participation rates for Indonesian males between 1980 and 2007. As a result, expected labor force particiIndonesian males between 1980 and 2007. As a result, expected labor force participation rates for Indonesian males rose to 43.7 years, which was 64.5 percent of life pation rates for Indonesian males rose to 43.7 years, which was 64.5 percent of life expectancy at birth in 2007. expectancy at birth in 2007. 7 The online Appendix tables provide calculations of expected labor force participation across 15 countries since 1980; see Appendix Table 8 in the online Appendix available with this paper at ⟨ http://e-jep .org⟩. Milligen and Wise (2011, p. 17) examine the age at which male mortality was 1.5 percent in 1977 and 2007, fi nding that at that age almost 90 percent of UK men were employed in 1977, but by 2007, only 30 percent were.
China and India are especially important cases to consider, given their large China and India are especially important cases to consider, given their large populations and relatively rapid economic development. In India, the share of years populations and relatively rapid economic development. In India, the share of years lived past 65 as a percentage of increase in life expectancy at birth was only onelived past 65 as a percentage of increase in life expectancy at birth was only onequarter (as shown in Table 2 ) in the most recent 20-year period. For China, that quarter (as shown in Table 2 ) in the most recent 20-year period. For China, that share was 52 percent for men and 41 percent for women in the 1990-2010 period. share was 52 percent for men and 41 percent for women in the 1990-2010 period.
China's position refl ects the rapidity of its demographic transition since the China's position refl ects the rapidity of its demographic transition since the early 1970s and its achievement of relatively high levels of health despite low per early 1970s and its achievement of relatively high levels of health despite low per capita income by the end of the Mao era (Banister 1987; Wang 2011) . 8 8 These earlier health improvements and growth of the working-age These earlier health improvements and growth of the working-age population contributed to China's unprecedented economic growth for the past population contributed to China's unprecedented economic growth for the past quarter-century. Wang and Mason (2008) estimate that between 1982 and 2000, quarter-century. Wang and Mason (2008) estimate that between 1982 and 2000, about 15 percent of China's rapid growth in output per capita stemmed from the about 15 percent of China's rapid growth in output per capita stemmed from the demographic dividend. (Bloom and Williamson (1998) estimate that one-quarter to demographic dividend. (Bloom and Williamson (1998) estimate that one-quarter to one-third of the growth rates in the "East Asian miracle" stemmed from the demoone-third of the growth rates in the "East Asian miracle" stemmed from the demographic dividend.) Although the pace of mortality decline in China has slowed, it graphic dividend.) Although the pace of mortality decline in China has slowed, it 8 Miller, Eggleston, and Zhang (2012) assess the relative importance of various explanations proposed for these gains, including better nutrition, widespread public health interventions, improved access to medical care, and increases in educational levels. They fi nd that gains in education and public health campaigns jointly explain 25-32 percent of the crude death rate decline under Mao, and similar proportions of the dramatic reductions in infant and under-fi ve mortality in that period. continues: Chinese life expectancy increased between 1990 and 2010 from 69.9 to continues: Chinese life expectancy increased between 1990 and 2010 from 69.9 to 76.8 years for women and from 66.9 to 72.5 years for men. 76.8 years for women and from 66.9 to 72.5 years for men. With a rapid demographic transition to relatively low mortality and low fertility, With a rapid demographic transition to relatively low mortality and low fertility, China's population is now aging (Peng 2011). Many policy challenges loom as China China's population is now aging (Peng 2011). Many policy challenges loom as China establishes social and economic institutions commensurate with its transition to a establishes social and economic institutions commensurate with its transition to a middle-income, market-based economy with a large elderly population (Eggleston middle-income, market-based economy with a large elderly population (Eggleston and Tuljapurkar 2010; Chen, Eggleston, and Li forthcoming). One additional and Tuljapurkar 2010; Chen, Eggleston, and Li forthcoming). One additional challenge for China in reducing the growth-slowing potential of the new demochallenge for China in reducing the growth-slowing potential of the new demographic transition is China's increasing burden of chronic disease. Fueled by rapid graphic transition is China's increasing burden of chronic disease. Fueled by rapid urbanization, increases in high-fat and calorie-rich diets, reductions in physical urbanization, increases in high-fat and calorie-rich diets, reductions in physical activity, unabated male smoking and other factors, prevalence of chronic disease in activity, unabated male smoking and other factors, prevalence of chronic disease in China has quickly caught up with that of high-income countries. For example, the China has quickly caught up with that of high-income countries. For example, the age-standardized prevalence of diabetes among adults in China was 9.7 percent in age-standardized prevalence of diabetes among adults in China was 9.7 percent in 2007-2008, more than three times reported prevalence in 1994 (Yang et al. 2010 (Yang et al. ), 2007 (Yang et al. -2008 , more than three times reported prevalence in 1994 (Yang et al. 2010 ), comparable to the U.S. rate of 8.3 percent overall in 2010 and 11.3 percent among comparable to the U.S. rate of 8.3 percent overall in 2010 and 11.3 percent among adults (CDC 2011), and higher than the OECD average (OECD 2011). adults (CDC 2011) , and higher than the OECD average (OECD 2011).
The timing and the rapidity of the longevity transition has varied across counThe timing and the rapidity of the longevity transition has varied across countries and regions. For example, in Japan between 1950 and 1970, only 13.1 percent tries and regions. For example, in Japan between 1950 and 1970, only 13.1 percent of increase in male life expectancy at birth was realized after age 65; for women, that of increase in male life expectancy at birth was realized after age 65; for women, that fi gure was 17.3 percent. During the 1990 to 2009 period, Japan led the world in the fi gure was 17.3 percent. During the 1990 to 2009 period, Japan led the world in the new demographic transition, with the share of gains in life expectancy at birth realnew demographic transition, with the share of gains in life expectancy at birth realized after age 65 reaching 72.7 percent for men and 87 percent for women (again, ized after age 65 reaching 72.7 percent for men and 87 percent for women (again, as shown in Table 2 ). as shown in Table 2 ).
The original and the new demographic transitions are inextricably intertwined The original and the new demographic transitions are inextricably intertwined with the evolution of social and economic institutions (Aoki 2011) . Evidence with the evolution of social and economic institutions (Aoki 2011) . Evidence is mounting that no society at an advanced stage of economic development can is mounting that no society at an advanced stage of economic development can presume that further gains in longevity will contribute to growth of per capita presume that further gains in longevity will contribute to growth of per capita income under currently prevailing institutions. For example, Lee and Mason income under currently prevailing institutions. For example, Lee and Mason (2011) compare the "average age of consumption" to the "average age of labor (2011) compare the "average age of consumption" to the "average age of labor income" income" 9 9 across a large group of countries for which they and their international across a large group of countries for which they and their international collaborators have collected detailed generational accounts, including the value of collaborators have collected detailed generational accounts, including the value of assets and transfer wealth from social support programs (but not including bequests assets and transfer wealth from social support programs (but not including bequests or value of nonmarket labor). They fi nd that for developing countries, net transfers or value of nonmarket labor). They fi nd that for developing countries, net transfers fl ow strongly downward from older to younger ages. However, in a "sea change" fl ow strongly downward from older to younger ages. However, in a "sea change" analogous to what we call the new demographic transition, "the direction of interanalogous to what we call the new demographic transition, "the direction of intergenerational transfers in the population has shifted from downward to upward, at generational transfers in the population has shifted from downward to upward, at least in a few leading rich nations" including Germany, Austria, and Japan (Lee and least in a few leading rich nations" including Germany, Austria, and Japan (Lee and Mason 2011, p. 116) . Although the Lee-Mason estimates are cross-sectional, the Mason 2011, p. 116). Although the Lee-Mason estimates are cross-sectional, the link to the longevity transition is clear: for the 13 countries that overlap between link to the longevity transition is clear: for the 13 countries that overlap between their dataset and ours, there is a strong negative correlation (-0.89 ) between the their dataset and ours, there is a strong negative correlation (-0.89 ) between the share of gains in life expectancy over the past 20 years that were realized after age 65 share of gains in life expectancy over the past 20 years that were realized after age 65 and the current number of years by which the average age of income exceeds the and the current number of years by which the average age of income exceeds the average age of consumption. In other words, the more the gains in life expectancy average age of consumption. In other words, the more the gains in life expectancy are concentrated in traditional retirement years, the closer the intergenerational are concentrated in traditional retirement years, the closer the intergenerational transfers are to being upward rather than downward. transfers are to being upward rather than downward.
For a broader group of 107 countries, Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2010) calcuFor a broader group of 107 countries, Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2010) 
Policy Implications of the New Demographic Transition
Historically, adults produced more than they consumed and supported chilHistorically, adults produced more than they consumed and supported children. With such a pattern in place, the increase in proportion of the population in dren. With such a pattern in place, the increase in proportion of the population in older years implied by the demographic transition might have been thought to shift older years implied by the demographic transition might have been thought to shift out the social budget constraint as people expanded their number of years worked. out the social budget constraint as people expanded their number of years worked. However, "a funny thing happened along the way: societies invented retirement . . . However, "a funny thing happened along the way: societies invented retirement . . . and the economic consequences of population aging are now viewed with alarm" and the economic consequences of population aging are now viewed with alarm" (Lee and Mason 2011, p. 115) . (Lee and Mason 2011, p. 115) .
Retirement, a relatively new phenomenon in human history, can be viewed as Retirement, a relatively new phenomenon in human history, can be viewed as a response to many economic and social changes. Contributing factors include the a response to many economic and social changes. Contributing factors include the shift from self-employment on farms or small businesses to wage and salary status; shift from self-employment on farms or small businesses to wage and salary status; more rapid technological change, resulting in more rapid obsolescence of human more rapid technological change, resulting in more rapid obsolescence of human capital (alongside compensation packages that often underpay at the beginning capital (alongside compensation packages that often underpay at the beginning and overpay at the end of a career, as discussed in Lazear 1981); the introduction of and overpay at the end of a career, as discussed in Lazear 1981); the introduction of a variety of health and welfare programs which assist the elderly but also discourage a variety of health and welfare programs which assist the elderly but also discourage work; an income-driven increase in the demand for leisure, with the diminishing work; an income-driven increase in the demand for leisure, with the diminishing marginal value of an even shorter work week overtaken by the effi ciency gains of marginal value of an even shorter work week overtaken by the effi ciency gains of a block of leisure at the end of life; and, in times of high unemployment, public a block of leisure at the end of life; and, in times of high unemployment, public concern about job opportunities for younger workers. concern about job opportunities for younger workers.
Will the new demographic transition inevitably lead to slower economic growth? Will the new demographic transition inevitably lead to slower economic growth? As people foresee longer lives, they might choose to work longer, save more, and/or As people foresee longer lives, they might choose to work longer, save more, and/or invest in human capital in suffi cient amounts and innovative enough ways that longer invest in human capital in suffi cient amounts and innovative enough ways that longer lives continue to contribute to increased prosperity. In this spirit, Bloom, Canning, lives continue to contribute to increased prosperity. In this spirit, Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2010) assert that "the problem of population ageing is more a function and Fink (2010) assert that "the problem of population ageing is more a function of rigid and outmoded policies and institutions than a problem of demographic of rigid and outmoded policies and institutions than a problem of demographic change per se" (p. 607). change per se" (p. 607).
It is not clear, however, that the United States or other high-income countries It is not clear, however, that the United States or other high-income countries even further along in the new demographic transition are reshaping their policies even further along in the new demographic transition are reshaping their policies and institutions suffi ciently in response to the longevity transition. Although both and institutions suffi ciently in response to the longevity transition. Although both the United States and France have increased the age of retirement or age to qualify the United States and France have increased the age of retirement or age to qualify for early retirement, social welfare systems across the high-income countries of the for early retirement, social welfare systems across the high-income countries of the world continue to give strong incentives for earlier, rather than later, retirement world continue to give strong incentives for earlier, rather than later, retirement (Gruber and Wise 1998 ). Between 1965 and 2005 , the correlation between change (Gruber and Wise 1998 ). Between 1965 and 2005 , the correlation between change in male life expectancy at birth and change in retirement age is actually negative: in male life expectancy at birth and change in retirement age is actually negative: -0.21 (Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2010, p. 591) . This trend cannot continue indefi --0.21 (Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2010, p. 591) . This trend cannot continue indefinitely: longer and longer retirement lives are not consistent with continued increases nitely: longer and longer retirement lives are not consistent with continued increases in per capita income unless there are signifi cant increases in savings, investment, in per capita income unless there are signifi cant increases in savings, investment, and productivity. It is ironic that the same phenomenon that led to higher GDP per and productivity. It is ironic that the same phenomenon that led to higher GDP per capita-namely higher life expectancy-could now lead to lower GDP per capita. capita-namely higher life expectancy-could now lead to lower GDP per capita.
Successful navigation of the new demographic transition calls for a combinaSuccessful navigation of the new demographic transition calls for a combination of policies to give incentives for more savings and investment (including in tion of policies to give incentives for more savings and investment (including in human capital) earlier in the lifecycle and for additional work later in the lifecycle. human capital) earlier in the lifecycle and for additional work later in the lifecycle. Two forces in particular might move the society in that direction: improvement in Two forces in particular might move the society in that direction: improvement in health, and reductions in the transfers that the elderly can expect to receive from health, and reductions in the transfers that the elderly can expect to receive from the young. the young.
Public policy should encourage higher labor force participation for the elderly, Public policy should encourage higher labor force participation for the elderly, both by reducing the disadvantages that employers face when employing older both by reducing the disadvantages that employers face when employing older workers and by providing enhanced incentives to individuals to continue to work. workers and by providing enhanced incentives to individuals to continue to work. "People cannot expect to fi nance 20-25 year retirements with 35-year careers," "People cannot expect to fi nance 20-25 year retirements with 35-year careers," Shoven noted (as quoted in Haven 2011). "It just won't work. Not in Greece [or] Shoven noted (as quoted in Haven 2011). "It just won't work. Not in Greece [or] the United States . . . Eventually, we are going to have to increase retirement ages." the United States . . . Eventually, we are going to have to increase retirement ages." However, increasing labor force participation for the 65-plus age group alone However, increasing labor force participation for the 65-plus age group alone probably won't make a big difference: even a doubling of those rates from their probably won't make a big difference: even a doubling of those rates from their 2007 levels of 12.6 for women and 20.5 for men would not bring the U.S. ratio of 2007 levels of 12.6 for women and 20.5 for men would not bring the U.S. ratio of expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth back to its 2000 level. expected labor force participation to life expectancy at birth back to its 2000 level. Increased labor force participation by men in the 50-64 age bracket is also needed. Increased labor force participation by men in the 50-64 age bracket is also needed.
Public policy might also seek to improve productivity, with an emphasis on Public policy might also seek to improve productivity, with an emphasis on education and building human capital early in the lifecycle, and on investment to education and building human capital early in the lifecycle, and on investment to reduce morbidity and improve the ability to work later in life. Whether compresreduce morbidity and improve the ability to work later in life. Whether compression of morbidity later in life will continue depends on whether improvements in sion of morbidity later in life will continue depends on whether improvements in medical technology and in the socioeconomic determinants of health are offset by medical technology and in the socioeconomic determinants of health are offset by adverse trends such as increasing obesity. A potentially promising focus here would adverse trends such as increasing obesity. A potentially promising focus here would be to consider investments in public health and medical technologies that reduce be to consider investments in public health and medical technologies that reduce morbidity and improve quality of life, as well as more focus on medical innovations morbidity and improve quality of life, as well as more focus on medical innovations that reduce costs of care. (One example of a policy consistent with both objecthat reduce costs of care. (One example of a policy consistent with both objectives would be expansion of palliative care as a substitute for what can otherwise be tives would be expansion of palliative care as a substitute for what can otherwise be extremely expensive end-of-life care in a hospital-especially in countries where the extremely expensive end-of-life care in a hospital-especially in countries where the concept of hospice services is relatively new, such as China.) concept of hospice services is relatively new, such as China.)
Finally, increased savings, investment, and capital formation could help in Finally, increased savings, investment, and capital formation could help in fueling endogenous growth (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990) . U.S. personal savings rates fueling endogenous growth (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990) . U.S. personal savings rates have been low for many decades. Increasing the savings rate of individuals before have been low for many decades. Increasing the savings rate of individuals before they retire would ameliorate the potential adverse impact of longevity on economic they retire would ameliorate the potential adverse impact of longevity on economic growth. Countries will need to make fi scally realistic structural changes to entitlegrowth. Countries will need to make fi scally realistic structural changes to entitlement programs-such as Medicare and Social Security in the United States-to ment programs-such as Medicare and Social Security in the United States-to support acceptable living standards and improvements in health. support acceptable living standards and improvements in health.
High-income societies are now facing a new demographic transition: the High-income societies are now facing a new demographic transition: the longevity transition. They must decide how to respond to mortality decline when longevity transition. They must decide how to respond to mortality decline when almost all of the decline will occur late in life. Additional increases in life expectancy almost all of the decline will occur late in life. Additional increases in life expectancy will result in further declines in expected labor force participation as a percentage will result in further declines in expected labor force participation as a percentage of life expectancy at birth unless there is a signifi cant rise in labor force participaof life expectancy at birth unless there is a signifi cant rise in labor force participation rates across both middle and older ages. Of course, increased life expectancy tion rates across both middle and older ages. Of course, increased life expectancy has great value independent of its relationship to per capita income (Murphy and has great value independent of its relationship to per capita income (Murphy and Topel 2006) . The original demographic transition gave society a "demographic gift" Topel 2006). The original demographic transition gave society a "demographic gift" of higher per capita incomes (Bloom and Williamson 1998) without much need for of higher per capita incomes (Bloom and Williamson 1998) without much need for a policy response, but the new demographic transition requires politically diffi cult a policy response, but the new demographic transition requires politically diffi cult policies if societies wish to preserve a positive relationship running from increased policies if societies wish to preserve a positive relationship running from increased longevity to greater prosperity. longevity to greater prosperity.
